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the prosecutor's ethical duty to seek and exercise 
discretion in seeking reasonable dispositions in 
cases. 
The Interests of Victims. A children's advocacy 
group weighed in against the bonus plan based on 
fear that prosecutors would force abused children 
to testify at trials in cases that could have been 
resolved through negotiated guilty pleas. This 
concern highl ights the interest a crime victim may 
have in resolving a criminal case without trial to 
avoid the possible trauma of being a witness. 
Efficient Use of Resources. Encouraging pros-
ecutors to take more cases to trial will also put 
greater demands on the resources of the prosecu-
tor's office, the police, and the court system, re-
sources that many view as already overextended. 
In a world of limited resources, using more re-
sources to try cases ultimately means that fewer 
worthy cases can be pursued. 
Misconduct. The prohibition against defense 
contingent fees in criminal cases is rooted in a 
concern that they would tempt the defense law-
yer to engage in illegal and unethical conduct to 
secure an acquittal. The same argument may be 
advanced regarding prosecutors. Rewards such as 
those that would arise under Plans 1 and 2 might 
induce some prosecutors to engage in misconduct, 
such as withholding Brady material or introduc-. 
ing questionable evidence. Many critics of current · 
prosecutorial practices believe that prosecutors 
are already too concerned about conviction track 
records, leading to misconduct If a prosecutor 
engages in unethical behavior, the prosecutor will 
be rewarded under contingent reward plans long 
before the case is likely to be reversed on appeal. 
Symmetry. Finally, one can make an argument 
based on symmetry. Model Rule 1.5 prohibits the 
defense lawyer from taking a case on a contin-
gent fee. One can argue, then, that simple fairness 
mandates a similar prohibition should apply to 
the prosecutor. 
Arguments in Fav'?r qf Rewards for 
Convictions · · 
Positive Incentives. All attorney fees, whether 
hourly, flat, or contingent, create both positive 
and perverse incentives for lawyers. Contingent 
rewards for prosecutors similarly create both 
good and bad incentives. For example, an incen-
tive structure that encourages prosecutors to try 
more cases reduces the temptation to overcharge 
a defendant at the outset of a case in order to gain 
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bargaining leverage. The greater the likelihood a 
prosecutor will have to prove charges at trial be-
yond reasonable doubt, the less the likelihood the 
prosecutor will add charges unsupported by the 
evidence. 
A contingent reward system could also help 
motivate lazy or underachieving prosecutors. 
The incentives such a system creates could mo-
tivate the "underzealous" prosecutor- the one 
who wants to leave work every day at 4:30 p.m. 
and won't take cases other than "slam dunks" 
that lead to guilty pleas and involve little work. 
In other words, like any bonus system contingent 
rewards motivate employees to work harder. 
Perverse incentives are inherent in all fee and 
salary arrangements. Rather than looking only 
at perverse incentives when deciding whether to 
ban a particular fee or reward arrangement, we 
should assess both its perverse and positive incen-
tives before making such a judgment. The same is 
true for contingent fees and rewards for prosecu-
tors. We should ask whether the risks in bonus 
or prize plans are significantly greater or signifi-
cantly less justifiable than other fee arrangements 
such as hourly fees for civil lawyers or flat fees for 
criminal defense lawyers. 
A Convenient Benchmark. While admittedly 
not precise measures of productivity, conviction 
rates at trial are easy to determine and send clear 
signals, factors that may be important in prosecu-
tor offices that are too overburdened to provide 
more insightful supervision and feedback. A Col-
orado district attorney, for example, explained 
that performance bonuses advanced the goals of 
her office- trying cases and getting convictions. 
She said that it was hard to find performance 
measures for trial attorneys, and that these were 
ones that the lawyers in her office know and can 
target. 
Trial SkiUs. Incentives based on convictions 
will likely increase the number of cases prosecu-
tors try. Regularly trying cases could help main-
tain and enhance the overall trial skills of the law-
yers in the office by providing trial experience and 
by encouraging prosecutors to work on their trial 
skills through courses and study. 
Symmetry. In response to the symmetry argu-
ment described above, that contingent fees and 
incentives should be banned for prosecutors be-
cause contingent fees are banned for criminal de-
fense lawyers, one might argue that the prohibition 
of contingent fees in criminal cases-whether for 
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de:fcn:$e counsel or pros{;Cl/~Orli ··· -is sn unju~t i li­
able ana..::hroni:->m .. b..s Charles Wolfram explnin" 
rl1e pmhibirion on defen$C .::onth:g~~n f' fees i~ a 
hi t~rorbtl accident, <tr.Jd u c-arry~()v.:-r fn)m a tim~ 
when an ~:omingcul fees \1-'Ct'C su.;pecr. Whik cor.-
lingenl t\..-e3 in ci\'il .:•.ts~~ became nu>rc aa:epkd 
by th~ early part o f lht) ~Oth century, there wa~ 
lingering susp idon that conting:::rlL fee~ in crimi-
nal cases co'Uld have a corruptjng intlu~n~.-:c. \\.Vol-
from points LHtt that tl·11.:re is no ro.::ason tO view the 
criminal def~n.;;e bar as more susceptible to the 
.::ormpting in·11uencc o f contingent lees than civil 
litigators. (CHARLES \V WotFR ~~, !vtool:'R~ Lr.:0.\L 
E'rH1cs § 9.4. ~ (19%). ) (f lhere i!' in:mfficknt 
justification tor banuing ~onringent fees tor lhe 
defense, one might argue that we should abando11 
that harl rather than extending it to prost.'l::tltors. 
Conclusion 
On balance we agree with the Reslatemrmr's po-
sition that contingent f~es should be banned f()r 
prosecutors. Similarly, we think that t he better 
view is that rc\v(.!rds tlw prosecutors contingent 
on trial convictions are unsound. 
The decision whether to otTer a negotiated 
guilty plea or take a case to trial is a wmplicated 
and nuanced. question with many vatiables. The 
reward systems in both p.!an~ described at the 
outset of this column are based on the assump-
tion that negotiated guilty pleas are always bad 
and alway:; involve inappropriate discounting of 
charges or sentences. T his is no1 a valid general 
assumption. The monetary rewards created by 
these incentive systems overly simplify what i:; 
and sh01.dd be treated as a complicated and m1-
an~Xd .;a!cu!us Jbr a pl\)S.:.~ntor. 
Second, we. hdil:'\'e tbal there i~ iusutikic;H 
justiiic~nion for the ri-;b ~nch ~.xm ringcnl ~<:ward:\ 
c:catc. At conlmon law. con1!ngent f(:es \\:ere twt 
tnh!rati.:d in :.-itl1~r the dvil or criminal cou.rcxt. 
Eventu~tlly a!J juri~dktion~ rejected that appr~:acb 
in civil G«:>es <) t\ the ground of neces-;ity, reason-
ing. thm witho ut. conttngem f~C$ :x)or persons 
with mcritori~1us claims wonlJ he denied acces8 
to th~ (Ourts becau:ic th~y wen~ too poor tu p.ay 
c::ounscL In sum, tbe acceptance of CClntingent 
Ice:; iu the ch·i l cont~xt is sopponcd by th~t.~ power-
t'ul justifi.carion that it prMl1l'le.;; acces:> to \:0Unse1 
for lht)::iC who oth..:nvise c.annot affbrd to retain 
coun::;el. There is no such justificutiun when the 
government pays the prose.cmor. 
In addirjon, there are ways to rncntor and 
mon itor prosecutors that arc t~u· prderable to re-
lying simply on lhe number or rate of trial convk·-
tions. Case file revi~ws, guilty plea. reviews, and 
observing prosec.:utors i11 hearings and tr ials are 
more precise ways to evaluate and mentor prose-
~mors. These methods for assessing performance 
are more nuanced and fine-tuned than triul and 
conviction ra.tes, whkh seem very c.rudc proxies 
for the qualilie!l we seek in prosecutors. 
When good performance is reduced to the per-
centage of wins in a specified number of trials, 
the im:ent ive strucrure fails to recognize that win-
ning or losing a case is not solely dependcu t on 
the prosecutur's performance. The outcome of a 
case depends on the quality of evidence, the work 
of the police invesligaring the case, and how wit-
nesses Jo on the stand. Win-loss records fail to 
take account of such factors. • 
